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Section 0 
! r i t roduct ion  
Section 0.1 introduces Ackermann's set theory and contains a brief 
summary of the history of work on the theory. Section 0.2 contains a
summary of the results of tlais paper. Sections 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 contain 
preliminaries for the later sections (notation, etc.). All notions used in 
0.1 and 0.2 will be fully defined in 0.3, 0.4, 0.5. 
O. 1. A ckermann's et theor.v 
The set theory of Ackermann is formulated in a first order language 
wittl one binary relation symbol ~, and one individual constant V. The 
objects the variables range over are referred to as classes, 'x E y' is read 
'x is a member of y', and 'x ~ V' is read 'x is a set'. Tiros the theory dis- 
tinguishes between sets and classes; every set is a class but some classes 
are not sets. (It is not assumed that every member of a class is a set.) 
The axioms are the universal closures of 
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lowing people for helpful conversations eoncc'.ning this work: R.L.Vaught, my thesis advisor 
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A1. (Extensionality) 
At ( t~x  ~ t ~j , )~ x =y .  
A2. (Class construction) 
Vz At ( t~z* - -~t~V^®),  
where O is any formula in ~ and V not involving z. 
A3. (Strong completeness of V) 
xE  V^ [ tEx  v At t (uE  t ~ uEx) ]  ~ tE  V .  
A4. (Ackermann's schema) 
x ,y  EVA At (O(x ,y ,  t ) *  1E V 
-* Vz  ~ V At ( t  E z ÷~ O(x ,y ,  t)) 
where the free variables of 0 are x, ~', t, and V does not occur in O. 
We will let A be the theory determined by these axioms. A* is o1: ~ained 
from A by adding the universal closure of the axiom. 
A5. (Regularity for sets) 
x~V^Vu(u~x)  
--, Vt~(u ~ x/x  At ( t  ~ x -, t q~ , ) )  . 
Perhaps ome remarks on the motivation for the theory A will be 
helpful. Our discussion will center on A4; AI, A2 are familiar and A3 
says that any member of a set is a set, and that any subclass of a set is a 
set. Ackermann interpreted the 'definite' in Cantor's well known defi- 
nition ("By a set we understand any collection of definite distinct ob- 
jects ... into a whole" [31, p. 282) as requiring t~:at in order for a col- 
lection of sets to be a set, "what belongs to the collection and what 
does not belong to it must be sufficiently shaprly delimited". (Acker- 
mann [ t ], p. 337.) Ackerl~aann considered that the concept of set 
itself" is thoroughly open, however, and thus not sharply delimited. The 
basis for A4 appears to be the idea that sufficiently sharply delimited 
collections of sets are sets. The hypothesis of A4 assures that the prop- 
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erty 't is a set such that ,;(,v, y, t)' is in a certain sense independent of 
the (extension of the)concept of set, and may be regarded as giving a 
sufficient condition for a collection to be sharply delimited. (A further 
dis,,:ussion of these ideas is contained in Section 5.~ 
Tile intuitive ideas leading to Ackermann's theory are thus seen to 
be quite different from those which lead to Zermelo-Fraenkel se~ 
theory (ZF). In that theory, of course, there are a number of set con- 
struction principles, and there is an appeal to the intuitive principle 
that a collection which is equivalent in power to a set must be a set. 
Thus it is not obvious how the two theories compare. 
It should bc remarked that the construction !~rinciples of ZF were 
originally fornmlated to reflect the practice of mathematicians; rather 
than starting from first principles and deriving set theory, one started 
with set theory (a'- it had been developed historically) and tried to find 
principles adequate to develop th,: theory which did not yield the 
known paradoxes: no attempt was made to provide a philosophical 
explanation of the source of the principles, or a clarification of their 
intuitive basis (see E.Zemaelo 12! l P. 26t, 262). For a contemporary 
discussion of intuitive ideas which, provide a basis for Zermelo's axiom's, 
see Kreisel 122], pp. 100-105. 
Much of the work that has been done on Ackermann's theory has 
been directed toward comparing A and ZF. 
(1) In the paper introducil.g the theory A [1 ], Ackermann showed that 
the retativizations to V of all of the axioms of Zermelo's theory (Z) 
(except for the regularity axiom) could be proved in A. He also stated 
that the replacement schema of ZF (relativized to V) can be proved in 
A (compare (2) below). An error in Ackermann's proof of this asser- 
tion was found by Levy [81, however, and the question remained open. 
Ackermann also introduced an extension Aoo of A which appears much 
stronger than A: instead of a class V of all sets, there is for each natural 
number n a class V,z of sets of 'type n', together with appropriate 
axioms (for a version of Ao~ see Chapter 4). 
(11) A.kevy showed (18]) that if there is an inaccessible cardinal, then 
there is a natural model of A (that is, one oi the Corm ( RCL e, Ra>, 
where ~ </3 are ordinals and R/3 consists ot the sets of rank less than t3). 
He also proved that 
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(1) If the relativization to V of a sentence o is provable in A*, then 
o is provable in ZF, 
thus showing that A* gives us no more information about the sets than 
ZF does. These results were also proved (with appropriate modifications) 
for Aoo. Levy proved a number of theorems within A, and in particular 
showed that a strong reflection principle holds in A*. Thus Levy showed 
that (the relativizations to V of) very strong theorems of ZF could be 
proved in A*, and he raised the question whether the converse of (1) 
holds. 
(1II) Levy and Vaught [10l developed the theory of A* further, show- 
ing that still larger classes of (the relativizations to V of) tt'eorems of 
ZF could be proved in A*. 
(IV) In his thesis [6], R.Grewe succeeded in obtaining a partial con- 
verse to (1): he showed that in every natural model (R/3, c, Rc~> of A, 
(R0~, e) ~ ZF (thus answering Levy's question for the case of natural 
models of A*). This result is included in the paper [6a]. 
Grewe also introduced a methof of interpreting extensions of A within 
A. 
(V) Levy [ 10] showed that (the relativization to V of) the complete 
reflection schema of ZF (which may be used instead of the replacement 
schema in axiomatizing ZF) holds for A 1 t formulas (in t.he hierarchy of 
formulas developed in [ 101 .) 
0.2. Results 
The main result of this paper is t~le converse of (1): 
(2) If o is a theorem of ZF, then the relativization to V of o is provable 
in A*. 
This, in conjunction with (1), shows that A* and ZF give the same in- 
formation about sets, and answer; the question of Levy mentioned 
above. It should perhaps be remarked that the proofs of both ( l )  and 
(2) are finitary, Recall that Ackermann originally stated that the re- 
placement schema of ZF (relativized to V) can be proved in A. Notice 
that (2) establishes this with A replaced by A*, i.e. assuming the axiom 
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of regularity for sets. Since A* is consistent relative to A in much the 
same way that ZF is consistent relative to ZF without regularity, this 
shows that Ackermann's statement is correct in the universe of "regular" 
sets and classes. 1 do not know whether the assumption of regularity is 
necessary (see question 4.24 and preceding discussion there). 
The proof o~" (2) is contained in Section 3. Actually the following 
stronger assertion is proved (Corollary 3.11 ). 
If F is any finite set of formulas involving only ~ and having one flee 
variable x, and q, is one such formula, then 
(,2) A*  I-- , I , (V)  --, V 'v ' (q , (V"~ AV ~ V' A 
A /~ AXE V lO v ~ 0 v'] ). 
~-~ E !: 
• This is stronger than (1). Sections 1 and 2 provide necessary prelimi- 
naries. In these sections, a n-amber of ki~own results which will be used 
in Section 3 are collected. In Section 1 it is also shown that a certain 
weak form of flae schema of replacement holds in A* (theorem 1.10). 
This result does not seem to have been observed before, and plays an 
important role ill Section 3. Section 2 contains ome general observa- 
tions concerning what can be proved in A* about the class of all ordi- 
nals which are sets. These observations enable us to apply in A* certain 
theorems which are known in Z. In particular, we apply Grewe's ~-esult 
on natural models of A [6, 7] (see theorem 2.8 of this paper; for the 
particular version we need, see theorem 2.12). it should be mentioned 
that the author's original proof of (2) made use of Grewe's method of 
interpreting theories in A, but that he subsequently found the simpler 
proof presented here which avoids use of these interpretations. 
Ic Section 4 we prove some additional results related to Ackermann's 
theory, and mention some questions that remaia open. We prove (I) 
A* is essentially not finitely axiomatizable over the theory whose 
axioms are the instances of A2. (II) The theorems of A*  (which is ob- 
tained from A~o by adding for each V n the regularity axiom A5 with V 
replaced by V n) involving only e and V 0 are exactly tl~e theorems of 
A* (when V is identified with V0). This shows that A*  is an extension 
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oF A* only in that it has some new individual constants. (III) If (R/3,~ e) 
is a proper second order extension of  ( Ra, e) (Re < 2 RI3 and c. E/3), ~" 
then (R/3 + 1, e, Ra) is a model of A*. We mention a related question 
of  Levy and Vaught (unpublished% Can there be ordinals a E ~ less than 
the first inaccessible cardinal such that Ra -< 2 R~? A partial answer is 
known (Tharp [ 24] ; see also Reinhardt [ 15a] ), namely, if the axiom of 
constructibil ity (V = L in the notation of  GOdel [ 5 ] ) holds, then ~ is 
2nd order indescribable (in the sense of  Hanf and Scott [ 7 ] ) and hence 
inaccessible. We mention here only two of  the questions raised in Sec- 
tion 4. (A) Suppose (Rt~+l , e, R~) is a model of A. Is there an ordinal 3' 
(a < 7 ~< t3) such that R e .<2 Rv ? (B) Is A + Z finitely axiomatizabIe 
over A? It should be noted that (assuming the consistency of ZF) the 
consistency of  A (when suitably formalized in A + Z) cannot be proved 
in A + Z; thus known methods of obtaining a negative answer fail. A 
positive answer, however, seems quite unlikely. 
Section 5 has two parts. 1'he first part extends the main result of 
Section 3 to certain extensions of Z and A. The second contains an 
analysis of the intuitive ideas behind Ackermann's theory. This analysis 
suggests the introduction of  an extension A+ of A. Further extensions 
of A + and related axioms for set theory will be studied in another paper. 
These axioms are complete reflection principles which seem natural and 
plausible. 
0.3. Set theoretic notation 
"fie use the usual notation for membership (~), inclusion, (c) ,  un- 
ordered pairs ({x, y} ), ordered pairs ((x,)'>)9 power set (Sx), union 
over a set (u  x), cartesian product (x x y). difference (x -- y), and 
union of two sets (x u y). We write { t : P(t) } for the set of all t such 
that P(t) (when such a set exists), and { (x, y)  : P(x, 3')} for { t : there 
are x ,y  such that t = (x,v) and P(x,y)}.  We put E x = {(u, v) : u E v 
and u, v 6 x} ; we will write (x, e) instead of (x ,  ex). Functions are 
taken to be sets of  ordered pairs in the usual way; Xy is the set of all 
functions with domain x and range included in y. We will occasionally 
wr i te r  : x --, y fo r f~ Xy. I fx  is in the domain of)'; the value of fa t  x 
is written f (x )  (we will also write l)c or Ix occasionally); if x is not in 
the domain o f f ,  we put f (x)  = 0. l f x ,y  are sets, we say x is (set theo- 
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ret ical ly)  equivalent o y in case there is a f lmct ion)"  : x ~ .v wh ich  is 
1 -- 1 and onto  y.  We say x is transitive iff y ~ z ~ x implies y ~ x. We 
def ine ordinals in the usual way as transitive sets which are well o rdered 
under  the e relat ion: the natural  numbers  are the ordinals which in addi- 
t ion are well o rdered by the converse relation. We let w be the set o f  all 
natural  numbers :  the empty  set 0 is the first natural  number .  If  u, 13 are 
ordinals, c~ +/3 is the ordinal  sum o f  u and/3, and we write a </3 for 
~ ~, o~ </3 for o~ </3 or ~ =/3. An ordinal  is called a cardinal  in case it 
is not equivalent o any smaller ordinal. A funct ion  whose domain  is a 
natural  number  is called a f inite sequence.  I f / ' i s  a funct ion,  then 
.f()i> = ( . f~  { (.x,.fx> } ) u {O,', .v> }. If a is an ordinal and there is a f'anc- 
tion .f such that for every/3 < a and an3 t, t ~ ,f/3 iff for some 3' ~ 13. 
t c .t7, then we write Ro~ =/ix (= sets o f  :~'ank < c~). We write Ra+n = R(a+n). 
0 .4 .5) 'n  tuc t i ca l  no  ta t iol l  
We will be concerned with first order language with variables 
v o, v I . . . . .  the usual !ogical symbols  =, ~,  A, and A, predicate symbols,  
operat ion symbols,  and individual constants,  together  with the usual 
rules o f  format ion.  Our pr imary concern  will be with a language with 
one binary predicate symbol  e (we write e~--e or e=~ if it will cause 
no confus ion) ,  and one individual constant  V. In the absence o f  indica- 
tion to the contrary ,  (9, ,,, q, will be formulas,  and (to simpli;'y nota- 
t ion) ,c, y,  z,/3 . . . .  will be respect ively the variables v0, v 1 , . . . .  In the 
usual way, we will write -(9/~ ~ for the con junct ion  of  (9 with ~', ~ (3 
for the negat ion of  ®, etc. Also we will write Au E v(9 for Au(u  ~ v -~ 
0) ,  u. v ~ w for u ~ w A v e w, etc. I fO  a . . . .  ,0 . _  1 are formulas,  then 
/Ik ~bn, will be the cot~iunction 0 0 A...A (9 ,  ~ : similarly for the dis- 
m E n 
j unct ion  Y4 ,1, m . If u is a variable or individual constant ,  and v is a 
.tl ~ 11 
term, b,: - " O(,, ) we unders tand  the formula  obta ined f rom O by replacing 
all free occurrences  o f  it by v, and changing the bound variables o f  ,I, to 
avoid coll isions if necessary (all occurrences  o f  an individual constant  
are free occurrences) .  We make the convent ion  that  if x 0, x l ,  -.., xn- l  
are terms., O(x 0, ..,, x ,  I ) will be the s imul taneous  substittation o f  
x0,  • .... ~,z-l for v 0, ..., o,  l respect ively (again changing bound 
variables if necessary).  By the formula  O ~ we unders tand  the formula  
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obtained from 0 by relativizing all quantif iers to ~ (A uO goes to 
Au(~0(u) ~ ~)) ;  i fu  is a term, we will write 0 u for 0 tx ~'~.  We will say 
that 4 is an e-formula if the only non-logical constant occurring in 0 is 
e; if we wish to emphasize that a formula may involve both e and V, we 
will refer to it as an e, V-formula. 
The following notat ion is not standard but will be very useful in 
sections 1-3.  If 0 is a formula and o a variable or an individual con- 
stant, then UoO is the formula 
O A Ao'(O(o°,) -* o = o') 
where o' is the first variable distinct from o not occurring in 69. 
Note: v is not bound hi UoO. UoO has all the free variables ~ has (as 
well as v), and asserts that 'o is the unique v such that O'. W" will write 
V!uO for VuUu•, and V!u ~ oO for V!u(u E o^ O) (where u is any 
variable and o any term). 
If X; is a set of  sentences, and o is a sentence, X; t- o will mean o is 
derivable from X; (in the usual first order logic with equality (=)). We 
will write t- o ip case 0 i- o. X; is a theory if for every sentence o (of 
the language of ~), if ~ I-- o then o ~ 1~. If O is not a sentence, we will 
understand Y. i- O to mean that if o is any universal closure of(~, then 
I-- o. If S and T are theories, S I-- T v means that for every o ~ T, 
S I-- ov .  
If T, S are sets of sentences we will write T + S for the theory 
{ o : T u S I- o } ; if o is a sentence we will write T + o for T + { o }. 
The set theory Z of  Zermelo) formulated in a language with one 
b:~aary predicate symbol e ) has the axioms of  pairing, power set, sum- 
se t, foundation,  and infinity (for formulat ions of these axioms see for 
example Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel [41 ) and the comprehension schema 
VzAt ( t~z  ~ ; t~x^O)  
where 0 is any formula in which z does not occur. Zermelo-FraenLel set 
theory (ZF) has in addit ion the replacement schema 
Au V!t~o -* Vz At ( t  E z ~ Vu  E x~o) 
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where z does not occur ;,n ~p. Q is the axiom 
Ax Vy Vr(RnO',  r) Ax ~ r) ; 
Z + is the theory Z + Q (Rn(y,  r) is a formalizatien o f r  = Ry; for an ex- 
plicit definit ion see Chapter !, p. l ). We also will w'ant to consider a 
weakened version Z - of  Z; Z is the same as Z except that the com- 
prehension schema of Z is replaced by the weak comprehension schema 
VzAt ( t~z~- , t$ ,x  AO y) 
(where z ~ y and z does not occur i~: O). Z 0 is Z without foundation. 
0.5. Semantical notation 
We will write '.)l t-:- ¢[x]  in case ?( is a structure, ~0 is a formula of  a 
language appropriate to ?1, x is an assignment to the free variables of ~0 
taking values in the universe of ?1, and ~0 is satisfied in '~1 by the assign- 
ment x. If o is a sentence v~e write ?! ~ o if for every assignment x, 
',~1 ~ o[x]. 
If ?l, ~ are two structures of the same type, ',~1 -- ~ will mean that for 
all sentences o (appropriate to that type) ?11 = o iff 2~ l= o, and Pl < '.~ 
('.)1 i~ an elementary subst;ucture of  ~) will mean that for all formulas 
® (appropriate to that type) and all assignments x to the free variables of 
O taking values in the universe of  ')|, 
,.~( ~ o [x t i f f  ,~, ~ ~ [x l .  
(See Tarski-Vaught [ 19] for discussion of these semantical notions; 
there 'k~ is an arith:netical extension of ')l' is used for ".~l is an elemen- 
tary substructure o£ ~ ' . )  
198 Ackermann "sset theory equals ZF 
,Section 1 
In this Section we define a number of e-formulas we will have need 
of i~l later chapters, discuss the absoluteness of these formulas, and col- 
lect a number of basic results of the theory A. 
1.1. Some e- jo rmulas .  We will have need to refer to the following e-for- 
mulas, These are taken directly from Levy-Vaught [ 111, p. 1047. 
Definition 1.1. a. x g y is the formula At ( t  ~ x -* t ~ y) and is read 
"x is included in y'.  We will frequently omit the dot. 
b. Cp(x) is 
(Ay, z ) (z  E y A.v  E x ~ z E x )  
'x is complete (or transitive)'. 
c. So(x) is 
Cp(x) A (Ay, z ) (z  ~ y A v ~ x ~ z E x )  
'x is supercomplete (or strongly transitive)'. 
d. Ord(x) is 
Cp(x)  A (Ay, z,  w 6 x ) iy  ~ y A (y  E Z, V F = Z V Z E ) ' )  A 
/~(w~y~z~w~Z) IA  Au[u  ~ x ^ Vt ( t  ~ u) - *  
V t ( t  E u A ~ Vs(s  ~ t ,^ s ~ tt))] /', 
^ (Au, v ~ x)(Vw C_ x )  A t ( t  ~ w ~ t ~ u A t ~ v)  
'X is an ordinal'. 
e. Db(x, y, z) is 
At ( tEz  ~ ~ t=xvt=y)  
'z is the doubleton {x, y } ' 
f. Oc(x, y, z) is 
(Vv, w G z)(Db(x, x, o) A Db(x, y, w)A Db(v, w, z)) 
'z is the ordered couple (x, y) ' .  
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o Rl (x  v ,z )  is 
V v(Oc(x, y, v,' ,, v E- z) 
'x is in the relation z to y' .  
h. Rn(x, y )is 
Ord(x) A Vz Rnk(x, y, z), where 
Rnk(x, y, z ) is 
Au(u  ~ x ~ V ~ Rl(u, v, z)) A 
AAu,  o{[uE .x 'AR I (u ,v ,z ) ]  v lu  =xAv =y]  
-~ At [ t  e v *--~ Vu' ,  v'(u' ~ u A RI(u', v', Z)A t C_ v')] } 
Rn(x, y)  is read 'y is the sets of rank less than x'. 
i. lira(x) is 
Ord(x) A At( t  E x -~ Vu(t  ~ u 6 x)) 
'.,," is a limit ordinal'. 
1.2. Absoluteness. We will occa-sionally need to observe that certain e- 
formulas are absolute, so we begin w~th some lemmas on absoluteness. 
Definition 1.2. Let ~f be a theory and let U ~-e a formula of  the language 
of T whose only free ,;ariable is x. ~, formula o is said to be absolute 
with respect o U over T i f f  
T I -Uv  0A Uv I ^...A U~_ l -+ lO+- - ,O  U] , 
where the free variables of 0 are e.mong v0 . . . . .  On- l "  
If V is an individual constant, then instead of  saying absolute with re- 
spect to the formula x ~ V, we will say absolute with respect o V. We 
witl say that 0 is absolute when we mean that 0 is absolute with respect 
to Ux over T, where U is a unary predicate not occurring in O, and T is 
the theory (in the language appropriate to 0 and U) whose only axiom 
is 
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Ax At(Ux ^  (t c_ x v t ~ x) -~ Ut).  
(Let us refer to this axiom as Sc U.) 
O is absolute over A (resp. A*) will mean that O is absolute with respect 
to V over A (resp. A*). 
Lemma 1.3. Let T be a theory, U a formula o f  the language o f  T whose 
only free variable is x. 
a. I ra  formula ® is absolute with respect to U over T, and 
T I- Uo 0 A..A Urn_ 1 A Vx O ~ Vx(Ux A O) ,  
where the free variables o f  O are among v o .. . .  , %-1, then Vx  0 is abso- 
lute with respect to U over T. 
b. Suppose 
T I-- Ax At(Ux A (t C_ X V t ~ X) -* Ut).  
Then the set o f  formulas I" absolute with respect to U over T contains 
all atomic formulas, and is closed under negation, dis/unction, and 
bounded quantification. That is, i f  0 and ~o are in I', then so are 6) A ~o, 
"" O, VX(X ~ y ^ 0) ,  and Vx(x  c_ y v 0) .  
The proof of Lemma 1.3 is trivial; part b follows from part a. 
Using 1.3 and the trivial facts 
Sc U I- Db(x, y, z) A Uz -* Ux A Uy 
Sc U I- Rl(x, y, z) A Uz ~ Ux z Uy ,  
one easily checks that 
Corollary 1.4. The formulas c_, Cp, Sc, Ord, Db, Oc, RI, Rnk, and lim 
are absolute. 
1.3. Theorems o f  A and A*. Next we collect for reference a number of 
basic results of the theory A. 
111eorem 1.5. (Ackermann) A t- Zo v, and hence A* I- Z v. 
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Proof. See Ackennann [ 1 ]. (Example: power set ax iom Take O = tc  x; 
A3 yields tc  xe  V~ te  V, so A4 says the power set o fx  is in V.) 
Remark. Since t- Oc(x, y, z) A Oc(x, y, z') ~ z = .-', Z I-- Vz Oc(x, y, z ), 
and Oc is absolute over A, by 1.5 A I- x, y e V ~ Vz e V Uz Oc(x, y, z). 
On the basis of  the class construct ion schema (A2) and the axiom of 
extensionality (A I) we see that 
A b Vx  Ux At ( te  x ~ te  VA OrdIt ) )  ; 
this justifies introducing an individual constant c~, and assuming 
A P Uc~ At( t  ~ c~ ~ t e V ^ Ord(t)) . 
(Recall that UxO(x)  means 'x is the unique x such that O(x)' . )  
k- Rn(x. y )^x '  ex  ~ u ' (Rn(x ' ,y ' )^  y' e y ) ,  
c. A2 i -  Rn(x ,y )Ax  C- V-~xC_ y ,  
d. A t-- Ord (c~), 
e. A t -Ax(Ord(~) -*xeavx=~vaex) ,  
f. A I - -Axe~ v v~VRn(x ,y ) ,  
g. A ~- Ax < a(Ord(x)  ~ Vy C V Uy Rn(x ,y ) ) ,  
O 
h. A* I-- Rn(o~, V). 
All of  a -  h are easily proved (Proofs of some or all can be found in 
Levy [8] ,  Levy-Vaught [11] ,  or Grewe [6] .) We remarkd that part e 
appears to be sensitive to the particular form~Jla chosen for Ord, and 
that this is the reascan for the clause 
Theorem 1.6. 
a. H Rn(x y)-~ So(y) ,  
b. 
Au, v c_ x Vw c x At ( te  w ~ te  u At(~ ~) 
in the definit ion of  Ord. 
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On the basis of  Theorem 1.6 part g, we are justif ied in infroducing a
unary operation symbol R and assuming 
A I-- x c_ a AOrd(x)-*- Rn(x, Rx) .  
When it will cause no confusion, we will omit the bar over the R. 
Theorem 1.7. (Levy). 
a. (Non-definability of  ~) 
AI - -~[y~VAUs®(~,y) ]  , 
b. (Reflection principle for ~) 
A I -y  E V A (7,~)(ot, y )  ~ Vx  E a 0 (x ,y )  , 
c. (Reflection principle for V) 
A* I -yE  *V A l~(V ,y )  ~ Vz~Z V O(2 ,y ) ,  
d. (Upward reflection for ~) 
A t-- y ~ VA O(~,y)  ~ VX[~ ~ X O(x, y)]  . 
Proof. We argue informally in A. 
a. Assume y ~ V A Uo~ ®(a, y); apply'ing A4 to the formula 
Vx(t ~ x A O(X, y))  we obtain a ~ V. But then a ~ ~,, which contradicts 
Ord(~). 
b. Using the fact that A I--- Ax(Ord(x)  -+ x ~ ~ vx  = a va  ~ x), one 
easily see:~ that (in A) 
[®(o~,y)A "~ VX E 0~ O(x ,y ) ]  ~ Ua[Ord(o0 A 
A O(~,y)A  "" VX E ~ O(x ,y ) ]  . 
From this and a, b follows immediately.  
c. follows by applying b to the formula 
Vz Vr [Rn(x , r )  Az ~ rA O(z ,y ) ]  , 
and using the facts 
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and 
A* F- Rn(e~, V) 
A t- Ax¢  c~ Vy e V Uy Rn(x, .v)). 
d. The proof is ;ike that for b. 
Remark. One can easily see that replacing the schema A4 by the reflec- 
tion principle for V yields an alternative axiomatization of A* (see Levy- 
Vaught [1 l l ,  p. 1057). 
Corollary 1.8. Rn is absolute over A*. 
Proof. It is enough to show that (in A) 
1 ) x, y ~ V ^ Rnk(x, y, z) --, Vz' E V Rnk(x, y, 2') 
as then we can apply Lemma 1.3. It is immediate from the definit ion of 
Rnk that 
Rnk(x. y, z) ^  x' ~ x r, Rl(x', y', z) --, y' ~ y ; 
using this it is easy to check that 
Rnk(x ,y ,z )^x,yE  V ~ Vz' C_ V Rnk lx ,y ,z ' )  
(just by taking z' = z n V. It is necessary to observe that Rl(x~ y, z) ^  
^x,  y 6 V --, Rl(x, .v, z')). Now applying Theorem 1.7c we get 
Vz'C_ V Rnk(x ,y ,z ' ) - ,  Vv~ V Vz'C_ v Rnk(x ,y ,z ' )  
so evidently 1 ) follows. 
Corollary 1.9. A* F- (Z + )v. 
Proof. Recall that Z + = Z + Q. We are to see then that 
A* I-- [ Ax Vy Vr(Rn(y ,  r) ^  x ~ r)] v .  Since A* F- x ~ V 
Vr(Rn(c~, r) ^x  E r), by the reflection principle (! .7b) we obtain 
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A* 1-- x E V ~ Vy  ~ V Vr(Rn(y ,  r) ^x  ~ y). Using 1.6 (parts f, g), and 
Corollary 1.8, the theorem follows. 
Theorem 1.10. (Weak replacement schema in A*). 
Let ~o be an e-formula with free variables among x, y, u, t. Then 
A* t -x ,y~ V^ Au~ VV!  tE  V¢~ 
Vz ~ V Ate  V [ t~z  ~-~ Vu ~x~o] .  
Notice that this differs from the replacement schema retativized to V 
only in that ~o is not relativized to V. 
Proof. We argue informally in A*. Assume x, y E V ^ Art E V V! t ~ V ¢: 
by A3 we also have then x c_ V. Using the reflection principle 1.7c we 
conclude that for some z' ~ V, 
I) x, yEz' /~XC_Z'/~ AUEZ'  V! t6z '~ ; 
byA3wea lsohavez 'CV.  Now use A2 to form z = {t~V:  Vu6x¢}.  
Evidently z c_ z' E V (if u c x ^ t E V ^ ~0(u, t), then by 1 ) we may 
choose t' ~ z' c_ V so that ~o(u, t'); our hypothesis on ~ assures that 
t = t', so t ~ z'), so by A3, z 6 V. The theorem follows immediately 
from the definit ion of  z. 
Remark. This theorem seems not to have been observed before. It will 
play an important role in Section 3. 
Theorem 1.11. Let T be a theory (in the language with e) such that 
A*IT v,  (i.e., for every sentence o, T t- o implies A* I- oV)and let 0 be 
any e-formula who,~.e only free variable is x. 
Now if O isabsolute over A* and valid in T (i.e., A* I- Ax 
E v [oV(x)  ~ , O(x)] andT ~ Ax®(x)) ,  dwn A* I- ®(cx). 
Proof. Immediate from tile fact that 
A I- Axe  V[O v (x) ~ O(x)] ,~, Ax ~ V 0 v (x) ~ 0(o0 ,  
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which follows from (the contrapositive of) the reflection principle for 
(l.7b). 
Remark. tn Section 2, we will apply 1.1 taking Z + for T. 
Theorem 1.12, (L~vy, Vaught). An #lterpretation o f  ~,* #z A is deter- 
mined by: the interpretation o f  x ~ y is x E y, :he interpretation o f  V~c .. 
is Vx  .. . .  and the intetT)retation o f  V is R~. 
Proof. See L~vy-Vaught [ 11 ]. 
Before proceeding to Section 2, we define some formulas which will 
be useful later on. 
Definition 1.13. 
a. Ct(x, y, z) is 
At [ t  ~ z ~-~ Vx'  ~ x Vy'  ~ y Oc[x', y',  t)] 
Ct(x, y, z) expresses 'z = x × y:. 
b. G(x, y, z, w) is 
At[t  E w ,--> (Oc(y,  z,  t)  v 
Vy ' , z ' [y '=  v A OcLv', z', t) ^  t ~ x])]  
G(x ,  y z ,  w)  e.~:presses 'w = x Q')'. 
c. F ' (x ,y ,z )  is 
Vu(Ct(y, z, u)^ x ~ u) ^ 
Vy' (y '  ~ y ~ Vz' E z Uz' Rl(y', z', x ) ) ,  
F'(x, y, z) expresses 'x ~ .Vz. 
d. Nn(x) is 
Ord(x) ^  Ay c_ x [ Vy'(y'  ~ y) -* Vy '~ v At ~ y (y' q~ t)] , 
Nn(x) expresses 'x is a natural number'. 
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Theorem 1.14. 
a. The fo l lowing are provable in A*: 
1. x ,  yEV-~ Vz~VUzCt (x ,y ,z ) ,  
2. x,  y ,  z E V -+ Vw -~ V Uw G(x,  y ,  z, w) , 
3. Nn(x)~x~V,  
4. Vz  ~ V Uz At ( t  ~ z ~. ; Nn(t)),  
5. y ,  zE  VAF ' (x ,y ,Z) ->xEV,  
6. yc_VAF(x ,y ) - ->xaV.  
1:. Moreover, Ct, G, F', Nn, and F atw all absolute over A *. 
1) 
and 
2) 
Proof. (al, a2). First observe that 
Ct(x, y, z) ^  Ct(x, y, z') ~ z = z ' ,  
G(x ,y ,  z, w)AG(x ,y ,z ,  w')--> w = w' . 
Now we will apply Theorem 1.5 (A* I-- Z v ). Since A* ~ x, y ~ V 
-~ Vz  Uz Oc(x, y, z) assures that 
A* b x ,y  ~ VA Vx' ~x  Vy' ~y  Oc(x', y' ,  t )~  t ~ V ,  
we can apply the lernma on absoluteness (1.3) to see that C~:(x, y, z) is 
absolute. Now 
Z t-- Vz Ct(x, y, z~, 
so, using, 1 ), part a l is clear. 
Using Lemma 1.3 again, and the fact that 
Ffx, y)  is 
Vz(Nn(z) ^  F'(x, z, y ) ) ,  
F(x, y) expresses 'x is a finite sequence with values in y'. 
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A*t - teV^Oc(v , '  ,.,,' t )~ .v ' , - '~V,  
G is seen to be absolute. Arguing as before and using 2), a2 follows. 
(a3, a4) Sihce A t-- Ay' ~ ~ Vt ~ a (y' ~ t), it is clear that 
A t- a c_ ,- . ~ Nn(x). Thus by 1.6e (comparability of ordinals with a) 
A t-- Nn(x) -- x ~ o~, and a3 holds. Since all quantifiers in Nn are 
bounded, by 1.3, Nn is absolute. Now a4 follows from a3 (using 1.5 
and the abso!uteness of Nn) and the fact that Z t- Vz  At ( t  ~ z ~ Nn(t)). 
(b) We have proved the absoluteness of Ct, G and Nn by the way. 
Since A t-- x ~ V .,x RI(y', z', x) ~ z' ~ V and RI is absolute, 
Uz' RI(y', -', x) is absolute. Thus using al and the absoluteness of Ct, F' 
is absolute. Since Nn is also absolute, a3 enables us to apply 1.3 to ob- 
tain the absoluteness of F. 
(a5) By the definition of F', 
t-- F ' (x ,y , z )~ Vt t (Ct ty ,  z ,u )Ax  C u ) ,  
so a5 follows by al and A3. 
(a6) Observe that 
l J Z i-- Ax At3{F(.,c, y)  ^  Rn(/3, y)/x lira(/3) - x ~ y ) .  
It is easy to check that the formula in 1) is absolute: F, Rn, and lira are 
absolutc (by a3, 1.4, and 1.8), A* I--- Rn(/3, y) -~/3 ~ y, and (by a3, a5, 
a~ad the definition of F) A* t-- F(x, y) Ay ~ V - 3- ~ V, so Lemma 1.3 
applies. Thus Theorem 1.1 1 applies and we have 
A* t-- F(x, V)A Rn(c~, V)A l im(a) -  x ~. V ,  
from which a6 easily follows (using 1.611). 
On the basis of Theorem 1.14, we may introduce individual con- 
stants ,~ and (for each n c ~ } ix n , and a binary operation symbol Val 
such that 
A* I- At ( t  ~ Co, , Nn(t)),  
A*I-- At ( t  ~ A o ~ t ¢ t) , 
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A*  1-- At(t~ An+ 1 *-+ t~  A n v t = A , , ) ,  
A* I- x ,y  ~ V^ Uz RI(y, z, x)-* Val(x,y) = z .  
We will omit the bar from ~ if no confusion will result. 
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Section 2 
In this Section we will use Theorem 1.11 of Section 1 to show that 
certain sentences of  the form ,I, (c~)are provable in A*. The sentences in 
questio~ express known results, so we will merely sketch the proofs in- 
formally in Z+, and take care to notice that the notions involved in the 
theorems are absolute. 
2, 1. Semantic and syntactic notions in Z. It is well known that all syn- 
tactic notiol~s are expressible in first order arithmetic as properties of 
(ol operations on) natural numbers, so there is a natural way of for- 
realizing all syntactic notions in Z using formulas of the for:-, 5) R~ , 
where O is an e-formula. Since A* F- Rw 6 V, evidently every sv ,~ 
formula is absolute over A*. in particular, we make the followir defi- 
nition" 
Definition 2. I. We understand ZF to be a formula obtained by imitating 
the informal definit ion (given in Section 0) of 'x is an axiom of  ZF'. 
Remark. Of course as it stands Definition 2.1 is not completely precise'. 
On the otiier hand there is no doubt that it could be made quite precise 
by explicitly exhibiting such a fo~'mula, and also no doubt that the 
effort would not be very rewarding: Definition 2.1 will be sufficiently 
precise for our purposes. 
Theorem 2.2. a. ZF is absoh~te over A*. 
b. I f  o is an a~:ioni, o f  ZF, then Z I- ZF(Ao). 
It is also well known that there is an e-formula Sat(x, y, z) (formaliz- 
i~.g (z, e> ~ y [x ] )  such that 
1 ) If v~ is an e-formula, and the free variables of ~0 are included 
among o 0, .... °,7 - l ,  then 
Zt -  [ ~ Val(a,A m,o , , , ) lAF (a ,z )  
m E !l 
z) ~ so z ) (Sat(a. A ,  
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where a, z are distinct variables not occurr ing i~a so or Sat. 
We would like to have the addit ional information that Sat is absolute 
over A*. ]'his is quite readily obtainable, since in any of  the usual for- 
mulas we would take for Sat, all quantif icatiol, is bounded (by simple 
functions of  z, such as Sz  or SSSz) .  For example, one possible defini- 
tion of Sat would have it correspond to the following informal defini- 
t ion of  sati,,~faction J  e-structures: 
Definition 2..3. We say that y is satis[ied in (z, e) under the a~signment x 
iff 
2) a) y is an e-formula, 
b) there is n E ~o such that x ~ "z and the free variables of y are 
anaongt, 0, ..., on_ 1 (that is, for every variable u occurring free 
in y there is m ~ n such that u is the ruth variabl,- (u = v m )), 
c) there is a relation s between subformulas of y and members of  
nz  (so s ~ ~ × nz)  such that (x ,y )  ~ s and 
d) for every a ~ nz, and all subformulas qs ¢, so', of) , ,  and all 
rn, n E to such that v m , v** occur in y, we have 
1. if ,1, = so ^  so', the', (,I,, a) E s iff (so, a) ~ s and (so', a) ~ s; 
2. if ,I~ = ~ so, then (q,, a) ~ s iff (~o, a) ~ s; 
3. if ,I, = A v m so, then (q,, a) E s iff for all t E z, (so, a(t2)) E s; 
4. if q' = o m E un, then ~,I,, a) E s i f fa (m)  E a(n). 
Now all the notions occurring in this definit ion are either syntactic 
and hence absolute over A* with respect o V (such as 'u = v m ', 
'q' = so ^  so", 'y is an e-formula', etc.) or else have been formalized and 
shown to be absolute in section 1. For example, 'a(m)E a(n)'  is forma- 
lized by 
1) Vu Vv (Rl(m, u, a)^ Rl(n, v ,a )^ u E v) ,  
' for all t E z, (SO, a(t~)) E s' by 
2) At  ~ z Ab(G(a ,  m,  t, b )  -~ RI(so, b, s ) ) ,  
'a E nz' by F'(a, n, z), and s c_ ~ × '*z by 
3) At  E s Vm Vf(Nn(m)  ^  F ' ( j ,  n z)  ^  Oc(m, j~ t)). 
The formulas displayed in ! ), 2), 3) are easily seen to be absolute by the 
use of the lemma oa absoluteness (1.3) and Theorem 1.14. Of course all 
quantifiers over ~o or formulas preserve absoluteness, o (writing 
~I,(.~, n, z) for the formula displayed in 3)) Sat(x, y, z) has the form 
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V, I  F'(x, n,z ) A % (y, n) ,\ Vs(,~, (s, n, : ) A 
A Aa lF ' (a ,  n, z) -, ~l  (a, n, : ,  y ,  s)l  )l , 
where F', ¢0, ~p, and ~1 are absolute. Now Sat is easily seen to be ab- 
solute using Lemma 1.3 and the following fact: 
4) A* H n ,z  ~ V A ~I,(s, n, z)-* se  V .  
The latter is easily checked; obviously 
A* H n, z ~ V A q , ( s ,n ,z )~ s~ V,  
so applying the reflection principle over V to 
As(q,(s, n, z) -~ s ~ V) 
we get 4). Evidently we also have in A* 
Sat(x,y, z)A z 6 V ~ x ,y  6 V.  
Thus we are led to make the following definition: 
Definition 2.4. We understand Sat to be an e-formula obtained by for- 
malizing clause 2) of Definition 2.3. 
Remark. This is the last vague definition, All remaining definitions are 
given precisely in terms of Sat and ZF. In particular all that is needed in 
Section 3 is that there are e-formulas Sat and ZF such that Theorem 
2.12 holds. 
The next theorem summarizes the properties of Sat so far discussed. 
Theorem 2.5. a. A* ~- Sat(x, 3,, z)/x z ~5 V ~ x, y ~ V. 
b. Sat is" absolute over A*. 
c. I f¢  is an e-form,d,~, and the free ~ariables o f  ~ are inc luded among 
v O, ..., vn_ 1, the~l 
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Zt - ' [  I~ Va l (a , /~ ,n ,Vm)^F(a ,z )~(Sat (a , /~  z ) ,  ,¢ : )  
m ~n 'P' 
where a, z are distinct variables not occurring #~ ~ or Sat. 
2.2. Some theorems o f  Z +. Now we proceed informally within Z + using 
the notions introduced above. After stating and proving the theorems 
we want informally, we will again return to the question of fomaaliza- 
tion and absoluteness over A*. 
Definition 2.6. lf~0 is a formula with free variables among v o .... .  Vn_ l , 
and a ~ hR.  t and a is the unique element in R v such that (R.~, e) 
~0[a (°)], we will say that 0~ is definable in (R v, e) by the formula 
under the assignment a; in case a takes values in a set A we will say that 
a is definable in (R~ t, e) using parameters from A. 
Theorem 2.7. (Montague, L6vy, Vaught). I t ' - / is an ordinal, a ~ 7, and 
<Ra, e> -< <R'r, e>, then <Ra, e> is a model  o f  ZF. 
Sketch of proof. (See Montague-Vaught [ 13]. Because we need to 
know 2.7 can be proved in Z ÷ we include here a sketch of  the proof.) 
If 7 = # + 1, then # is definable in W,7, e~ as the last ordinal. Hence ~ is 
also the last ordinal in (Ra, e), i.e./~ + 1 = c~. Thus 7 must be a limit or- 
dinal; this assures that (Ra, e~ is a model  of  Z, so it suffices to check the 
replacement schema. 
Evidently for ar~y c-formula O whose free variables are among x, y 
we have 
1) (RT, e, Ra) I = Ax, y ~ V(® v ~ O) ,  
so wc argue informally from this schema. Also, 
2) (RT, e, Re) N Ax,  y (xEyEV- - ,xEV) ,  
so we assume this axiom. We will show that the replacement axiom 
holds relativized to V. Now using 2), the hypothesis of the replacement 
axiom relativized to V is of the form 
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3) x, y E V A Au ~ x V! t E V cv (u, t, y ) ,  
where the free variables of ~p(tt, t, y) are anaong tl, t, y. Now we fix x, y 
satisfyipg 3). Applying 1 ) to ¢, we see 
x ,yE  V A AuEx  V! tE  V~o(u , t ,y ) ,  
SO 
4) Vz[x,  yez  ^AuEx V! tez~o(u , t ,y ) ]  . 
Now applying 1) to 4) (and using 2) again) we see 
Vz e V[x ,y  e z A Au e x V! te  z ~0v (u, t , ; ' )]  • 
consequently 
5) VuCxs0V(u , t ,y )~ tE  z E V . 
The comprehension schema of Z holds in CRy, e), so 5) assures that 
VzEV( t~z~ Vu~x~0 v(u , t ,y ) )  
which is the conclusion of the replacement axiom relativized to V. Thus 
(RT, e~ is a model of ZF. 
The next theorem is Grewe's important partial result in the direction 
of our main result (Theorem 3.1). It will be used in our proof of 3.1. 
In understanding Theorem 2.8, it may be helpful to notice that 
<R~, e, Ra) is a model of A iff a ~ t3 and a is not definable in iRe, e) 
using parameters from Ra. 
Theorem 2.8. (Grewe). Suppose that (~ is an ordinal, ~ E ~, and t~ is not 
definable in (R/3, e) using parameters f rom Ra. Then there is a 7 such 
that ~ E 7 <- ~ and 
(R~, e) -< (R'r, e). 
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Indeed, i f  there is an ordinal 8 such that ~ E 6 and ~ is definable: #2 
(Rt~, e) using parameters f rom Ra, we may choose 3" to be the leastsuch 
ordinak otherwise we may take 3" = (3. 
Sketch of Proof. (See Grewe [61 for a detailed proof.) Assume tim 
hypothesis and let 3' be chosen as in the theorem. Evidently the choice 
of 3' assures that the schema 
1) x 0 . . . . .  Xn_ 1 EVAOrd( f )AU60(5)~5 EV 
(where 0 is an e-formula with free variables among x o, x I . . . . .  x,z._ l ) 
holds in (R't, e, Ra) (in other words, every ordinal definable in (Ry, e) 
using parameters from Ra is in Ro~) because 
if 
and 
then 
is an ordinal definable in (RT, e) in terms of parameters 
from Ra , 
7 is an ordinal definable in (R~, e) in terms of parameters 
from Ra,  
6 is definable in (Rt3, e) in re'ms of parameters from R~. 
Evidently 7 cannot be a successor ordinal, so (R3,, e) satisfies the theory 
Z and the axiom 
Ax Vy Vr Ix ~ r,~, Rn(y, r)l . 
Now in (R3,, e) we certainly have (for any e-formula O) 
Vu0-~ V6U~5[ Vu Vr(Rn(6,r) Au~rAO)A  
A"  Vo '~ Vu  Vr(Rn(6',r)AuErAO)] 
and so the schema 1) assures that 
2) EVA VuO "* Vu E VO XO' ""' Xn-1 
(where 0 is a formula w~th free variables among x0 ..... xn- l  ) holds in 
(R3', e. RcO. 
Now from 2) it is easily seen and well-known that (Ra, e) -< (Ry, e), 
as desired. 
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2.3. Formalization m A*. Now we wish to state formal versions of 
Theorems 2.7 and 2.8 and make some remarks on the absoluleness of 
the formulas involved. For this pthpose we introduce some notation. 
Sat is the formula of Definition 2.4. 
Definition 2.9. (a) E(x,y)  is the e-formula 
Vr Vs[ Rn(x, r)/x Rn(y, s) ,', 
/x A~. a(Sat(a, ~o,x) + Sat(a. ¢, v))]. 
E(x, y) formalizes '(Rx, e) < (Ry, e)', 
(hi ModzF(x)is the e-formula 
As0{ZF(¢) -+ Va Sat(a, v~, x)) .  
Modzv (x) formalizes '(v e} is a model of ZF'. 
{c) S(x, y, z, u) is the e-formula 
Vr Vn Vb[Rn(u, r)A AtIt ~ n)AG(b, v, n, z) /xSat(b,y, t ) ]  ; 
here G(b, x, J~, z) is the e-formula introduced in section 1 which for- 
realizes "b = x(',' } ". 
0)] ,. Thus UzS(x, y z, u) for- S(x,,7, z, u) formalizes'(Ru, e) ~ y[X(z 
realizes 'z is definable in (Ru, e) by the formula y under the assignment 
X ~" 
(d) D(x,y)  is the e-formula 
V~, a, r[ Rn(x, r).,~ F(a, r) ^ UxS(a, ~, x, y) l  • 
D(x, y) formalizes "x is definable in (Ry, e> using paran ;ers from 
Rx ' .  
Theorem 2.10. E, Modzv, S, UzS and D are absolute over A*. 
Proof, To see that E, Modzv, S, UzS, and D are absolute, apply the 
lemma on absoluteness of section I, making use of the tbllowing facts: 
1. Sat, Rn, ZF, and G are absolute. 
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2. A*  I-- ZF(x) ~ x ~ V .  
3. A* i -x~ Vv  Sat(a, ~0, x) ~ a ,¢~ V .  
4. A* t-- Rn(x, r)  ^  x E V --> r ~ V .  
5. A* I-- S(x ,y ,z ,u )~z~u.  
Now we state the formal versions of  Theorems 2.7 and 2.8. 
Theorem 2.11. 
a. Z + I- a ~ ~ ^  E(a, t3) --> Vr[ Rn(e,  r) A MOdzF (r)l ; 
b. Z + I- aE /3^"-  D(a , /3 )^Ord(#)~ V¢,aE  Ra V3'(~ ~ 3' A 
^ E(~, 3') ^  [3' =/~ v U3'S(a, ~0, 3', 8)] ) ; 
,c. Z + I- Rn(/3, x)  AMOdzF(x)-> o x fo rany  axiom o of  ZF: 
d. Z + t-- a, 3' c_ ~ A~ ~ 7 A E(~, 7) ~ Ax E Re[oRS(x)  ~ ORV(X)] 
for  any e-jbrmula ® whose only free variable is x. 
Here ~, [3, r, ~o .... are o f  ~ ourse suitably chosen distinct variables. 
Proof. a. is just Theorem 2.7, b. is just Theorem 2.8, c. is an immediate 
consequence of Theorems 2.2 and 2.5 (c). and d. is also a consequence 
of  2.5(c). 
Theorem 2.12. 
a. A* t-- Ax(x  ~ a A~ D(x, a ) -  Vr IRn(x , r )A  MOdzF(r)]) • 
b. A*I-- x(xEa^~ D(x ,a )~V¢,aERx V3'(X~3, A 
A E(X, 3') ^  [3' = ~ v U3'S(a, ¢, 3', c~)l )) ; 
c. A* I- ModzF(Ra)  ~ ors  for each axiom • of ZF ; 
d. A* I- Ax, 3' c_ 0~ (x E 3' A E(x, 3') ~ Ate  RxlORX(t)~-=~ @R~(t)] ), 
where O(t) is any e-)brmula whose only free variable is t. 
Proof. Using Theorem 2.10 (and fact 4 of the proof of 2.10) one easily 
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checks (using the absoluteness lemma of Section 1 ) that the formulas in 
Theorem 2.11 (considered as properties of ~, that is, leaving/3 free but 
universally quantifying all other free variables) are absolute over A*. 
Thus Theorem 1.11 applies and we conclude that in A* o~ has ti~e prop- 
erties considered. This proves 2.1 2 c and 2.1 2 d. 2.12 b follows because 
A* I- Ord(~), and 2.12a then follows from 2.12b. 
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Section 3 
In this Section we prove our main result, 
Theorem 3.1. For every sentence o (involv;ng only e), o is a theorem o f  
ZF i f f  o v is a theorem o f  A*. 
The implication from right to left was proved by Levy [8] (for a 
sketch of the proof see Theorem 4.18); we will prove the reverse impli- 
cation. We begin with an important lemma. Recall that U/3O says tha t/3 
is the unique/3 such that O. In other words, that/3 is defined by O (in 
terms of the parameters of 0). 
l.emma 3.2. Let O be any e-formula. Then 
A* t-- x ~ V A U/~@(/3, x) ~ "-" D(ot,/3), 
provMed the free variables o f  O(/3, x) are among/3, x. (Here D(a, #) is 
the formalized version o f  '~ is definable in (R/3, e) in terms o f  param- 
eters from Rot' which was indicated in Section 2. ) 
Proof. Consider the formula D(ot,/3); it is of the form 
I) V¢ ~ ¢o Va[ Vr(Rn(ot, r) ^  F(a, r)) ^  UotS(a, ¢, a,/3)1 , 
where F and S are e-formulas. F(a, r) is a formalized version of 'a is a 
finite sequence taking values in r', and S(a, ~, a,/3) is a formalized ver- 
sion of 'if the first variable of ~ takes the value a, and the remaining 
variables are assigned according to the sequence a, then ~ holds in 
(R/3, e)'; thus UrnS(a, ~o, ~,/3) formalizes 'a is definable by ~ in (R/3, e) 
using parameters ai'. The formalizations we have in mind were indi- 
cated in Sections 1 and 2 (1.13, 2.9(; for the remainder of the proof, 
however, S can be any quaternary e-formula, and all we need to know 
about F is that A* I-- F(a, V) -~ a ~ V. Thus if we replace F(a, r) by 
F'(a, t) = F(a, r) ^  a ~ r we obtain a result independent of the formali- 
zations of Section 2. 
We now argue informally in A*. Suppose that 1) holds. Now (in A) 
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F(a, V) ~ a e V, and ~ _c V, so choosing a, ~ as in 1 ) we see 
2) a, ~ e V ^ UaS(a, ¢, a, t3). 
Now the hypothesis in Lemma 3.2 is 
3) x e V^ U~O(3, x ) .  
Evidently 2) and 3) imply 
4) x, a, ~0 e X, ^  Us Vt~(O(¢~, x) ^ S(a, ~, a, ~)),  
which contradicts 1.7 a. Hence (assuming 3)) 2) must fail, and conse- 
quently 1) must fail, thus proving the lemma. 
Remark. We might say that the point of  this proof  is that "definable 
inside implies definable outside". Notice that the hypothes~s of  the 
formal assertion says that O provides an e-definition of/3 in terms of  a 
parameter from V. We know that there is no e-definition of ~ in terms 
of parame'ers f lom V = Ra (1.7a), and it is a techpical point (which 
however equires ome care) to see that (under the hypothesis) if
D(a, ~) i.e. 'a is definable in <R~, e> in terms of parameters from 
Ra = V', then we can find an e-formula defining a in terms of param- 
eters from V. Of course, the passage to the outside adds new param- 
eters. 
Definit ion 3.3. Let q, be any e-formula whose only free variable is v 0. 
Then DF* is the set of all universal closures of formulas of the form 
e V ^ ,I, (t3) ^  Ord(13) A U~O(/3) ~ t3 e V ,  X O, . . . ,  Xn__ 1 
where x .., Xn_  ~ , v 0, ~3 are distinct variables, and O is an e-formula 
whose free variables are included among x o,  ..., Xn_ l ,  Vo. 
We will refer to DF*  as the schema on definable ordinals (obtained 
from ,I, ). If q, is Ax(x  = x ) ,  we will write DF for DF* .  We have allowed 
finitely many variab!es x m in O; using the pairing axiom for sets (which 
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holds io A*), finite sequences of  elements of  V are representable in V 
(that is, 
A[-AXo,... ,xn_ 1eV VyeV /'A [Vai(Y, Am)=Xm]), 
men 
so it is easily seen that (over A) one variable x 0 (in addit ion to ~) would 
suffice. 
Definition 3.4. Let q, be any e-formula whose only free variable is v 0 . 
For each e, V-formula O and each variable u, Q,I, u® is the formula 
V~U#( [q,(~)A Vu Vr(Rn(#, r) AU ~ r , \  O)] A 
A .-- V/3' E /ji[q'(~') ^  VU Vr(Rn(/ f ,  r) A U E r ,~ O)1 } , 
! 
A 
where ~, r, ~' are the fir~t three variables which do not occur in O. 
Q* uo  is to be thought of as a quantif ier; Q* u® expresses 'There is 
a u such that O(u), indeed there is a unique minimal ordinal/~ such that 
q' (t3) and some u of  rank less than # satisfies O(u)'.  
Notice that the free variables of  Q* uo  exclude u but otherwise are 
the same as those of O. 
Definit ion 3.5. Let q, be any e-formula whose only free variable is v 0. 
l¢or each e-formula O, 09  is the eormula determined by the recursive 
l 
condit ions 
(U E o)Q = U ~ o , (~ o)Q ='~ (O Q) ,  
(O V ~p)Q = (oQ)v  (~0Q), (V/40) o = Qq'/t(oQ ) ,  
where u and v are variables and O, ~0 are e-formulas. Of course O Q de- 
pends on ,I, ; if necessary we will write OQ q' . 
Notice that the free variables of ®Q are the same as those of  O, and 
that oQ is an e-formula. 
Now we state the main lemmas that will be used in the proof  of 
Theorem 3.1. 
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Lemma 3.6. Let  ee be an e- Jormula (whose  oi~ly free variable is v 0 ) smh 
thot 
A* 1-- q , (~).  
Then jo r  every e-jOrmtda (9 wi th  .free variables x o . . . . .  x,7__ ] we have 
A*+DF 'v I- x 0 .. . .  , x  l ~V- - ,  [O v÷~ -6)O 'I'] . 
(Recal l  that ~ is an indn, idual constant  introdttced so t,,~at 
A* I- Ax(x  ~ ~ ~ ~ Ord(x)A x e V).) 
I xmma 3.7. Let  q, be an e-fpr/,zttla whose  on ly  f ree ~.ariable is v o . Then 
fo r  each instance o o f  DF 'v we have 
A* + ~ o h V/3[a ~/3 ;', q'(~) A ~ D(~, ~-~)l • 
For  a gl impse o f  the role Lemma 3.7 will play, observe that a ~/3 
A "" D(a,/3) occurs in the hypothes is  o f  Grewe's Theorem 2.8. 
Proof  o f  3.7. Le~nma 3.7 is really a corol lary o f  Lemma 3.2. To  see that 
3.7 fol lows from 3.2. observe that if o is an instance o f  DF* ,  then (with- 
out  loss of  general ity we may assume) --- o is the existential closure of  a 
formula 
1 ) x ~ V A q; ((3) A Ord(tS) A U~O(~, x) A t5 ¢ V ,  
where tp is an e-formula and eyeD; free variable of  ~p(t3, x) is {3 or x. Now 
we assume 1) and argue informal ly in A*. A theorem of  Sect ion 1 
(1.6e) assures that 
Ord(~) n/3 q~ V --* ol E 13A~ =~ , 
and of  course by the ref lect ion principle 1.7a, 
x~ V^ Ut~O(t3, x) -*  a :~ ~,  
so the cond i t ion  a 6/3 is satisfied. (Incident~tlly, this is the o;'ay point  
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where we make use of the clause 'Ord(/3)' which appears in the defini- 
tion of DF*.)Evidently the Lemma 3.2 applies, so ~ D(0~,/3) and we 
obtain the Corollary 3.7. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1 from 3.6 and 3.7. Choose xp to be 
w I ( t 
Ax E x[ ~ D(x , x)  -~ Vr (Rmx , r) A MOdzF(r))] . ,; 
By Theoiem 2.12a, we see that A* i-- q'(a), so both lemmas (3.6, 3.7) 
apply. The essential point here is that a is quite well behaved in the 
e-part of :~he theory A*, even though (fc, r example) Zennelo's theory Z 
does not hold for the classes of A. Evidently by 3.7 and our choice of 
q', for each instance o of DF* we have 
A* + ~ o k- MOdzF (Ra) 
and consequently b  theorem schema 2.12c for each axiom o 0 of ZF, 
1) A*+~o I -o~ . 
On the other hand, using 3.6 and the weak replacement schema 1.1 O, 
we see that for each axiom o 0 of ZF 
2) A*+DF*  I -o  v " 
indeed (we now argue informally), by 1.5 it is sufficient o show that 
the replacement schema holds relativized to V. Evidently this amounts 
to 
3) x ,y~ VA As~ V Vt~ V[~oV (x, y,  s, t) ^ 
A At '~ V(,~v (x, y, s, t')-+ t = t')] -~ 
-~ Vz~VA~V(t~z<.~ Vs~x~oV(x ,y ,s , t ) ) .  
Since all quantification i 3) is relativized to V, we see using 3.6 that 
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replacing ~0 v by ~0 Q at each of  its occurrence~ yields a formula equivalent 
to 3). Since ¢0 is an ~-formula, 3) becomes an instance of  the weak re- 
placement schema. This completes the proof  of  2). From 1) and 2) it 
follows that for each axiom o of  ZF, 
A*  t -  o v , 
which is the assertion of  Theorem 3. !. 
We now proceed to the proof o f  Lemma 3.6. The basic idea of  the 
proof  is co,~tained in a sublemma: 
Lemma 3.b. Let q, be an e-formula (with one flee variable v o ) such that 
A* t- q~(~). Then 
A* + DF* I--x 0 .. . .  ,xn_ 1EV-~ [VuE VO +-~ Q~'uO]  , 
where @ is any e-formula nd the free variables of  O are among 
XO,  """ Xn- I  , and u. 
Proof. Since q, will be fixed throughout the proof" we will write DF for 
DF* ,  Qu "or Qu 'v , etc. 
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that v o does not occur in 
O. Then Qu@ is 
where x is the e-formula 
'Is (t3) ^  Ord(~3) ^  Vr Vu[ Rn(/3, r) ^  u ~ r A O | . 
Now we argue intbrmally within A*. We are to assume x 0, .... 
Xn_ 1 E V aI~d show Vu ~ V O ~ --~ QuO. 
First suppese Vu ~ V O. In A*, Ra = V ^ Ord(~), and by hypothesis 
we also have , '  (a), so Vu ~ VO implies X(a). By the reflection prin- 
ciple, VI3 E a X(~'). Using the class construct ion principle A2, we may 
consider 
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A = {3 ~ o~ " ×(3)} . 
Now A ~ 0, so since Ord(a)  there is a minimal  member  ~ o fA .  Using 
basic propert ies o f  ordinals, one easily sees that this # satisfies 
U/3[X(~) ^  A~' E ~ --, X(~')] 
as desired. (The propert ies involved are: #' ~/3 ~ a -~/3' ~ a, and/3 ~ a ^ 
^ Ord(y)  -~ # ~ y v/3 = y v y ~/3.) This direct ion o f  the equivalence 
does not  t se the schema DF. 
Now suppose QuO, i.e. V#U~3[×(lJ) n ~ V#' ~- ~×(~')].  We are to show 
Vu ~ VO. Fix j3 such that 
U/~Ix(~)  A A~'~ ~ "" X(~' ) ]  • 
Evidently 
x o, ..., Xn_ l ~ V A q'(~) A Ord(/3) ^  
A U~Ix(~)  A A~' e fl "" ×(~')1 -~/~ e V 
is an instance o f  DF, and since x(~) ~ q" (~) ^  Ord(t3), the hypothes is  is 
satisfied. Thus # ~ V ^ X(~), so 
~ V^ Vr Vu[u ~ r^ Rn(#, r )^Ol  . 
Since ~ ~ V, by Theorem 1.6, R~ c_ Re = V, and we have Vu ~ VO as 
desi~'ed. 
This completes the proo f  o f  Lemma 3.8. 
Proof  o f  Lemma 3.6. Lemma 3.6 is now immediate  from the sub lemma 
(3.8) by induct ion on formulas. We discuss only the case where 
(9 = Vu,p. By induct ion we may assume 
1) Xo, .... Xn_ l ,u~,  V È !~v ~,pQ]  , 
where x 0, ..., xn_ l , u are the free variables o f¢ ,  Now 
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XO . . . . . .  ~:n- ~" 11.~ V-'* [ Vu  E V(tp V]~ VII E V(tp Q)] 
(by the induction hypothesis), and 
-~ [ Vu ~ v(¢Q),  ,, Qu(¢Q)I 
(by 3.8!, alld hence (by the definitions of 19 v and O Q) we have 
A'0, ...,Xn,_l E V ~ [( Vlttp~ ] ~ (V/t~p) Q] , 
which completes the proof for the case ® = Vu~0. 
This completes the proof of 3.6, and he!ace Theorem 3. ! is proved. 
Remark. It is perhaps worth remarking that on the basis of the theory T 
obtained from A* by adding the axioms of Z and the axiom 
Ax Vy Vr(Rn(y, r) A ,," ~ r) we can obtain a sharper esult than 3.6, 
namely 
T + DF I- Axe  V[6) v +--~- ~9] . 
This is because in T 
v ~ V ,\ VxO(x, y) -~ Qx-O(x, y) ; 
since o contains -mlimited quantifiers, the proof appears to make quite 
essential use of the comprehension schema of Z (to form 
{/3' e ~3 : VrVx(Rn( f J ' , r )^xer^®)}) .  
Analysis of the proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that we can obtain a 
slightly stronger version. 
Theorem 3.9. For every e-formula O (whose only free varhlble is x) 
there is an e-formula ~3 (whose only free variables are x and y) such that 
A t-- VyE  R~ /kx E Ra[®RC~(x)~--* ~(x ,y) ]  . 
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In view of the weak replacement schema 1. I0, Theorem 3.8 imme- 
diately yields Theorem 3.1. 
Remark. I do not know whether it is possible to eliminate the param- 
eter y from O. In the abstract [ 15 ], it is mistakenly claimed (Theorem 
3. o~ [ 15] ) that the proof of Theorem 3.1 yields this stronger result. 
Theorem 3. of [ 15] should be replaced by the above Theorem 3.9. 
Proof of Theorem 3.9. In view of the fact that there is an hlterpretation 
of A* in A in which Rt~ plays the role of V (Theorem 1.1 2), it will suf- 
fice to, prove the theorem in A*. We will need the following: 
I.emma 3.10. Let 0 be an e-formula with one free variable x, and sup- 
pose there is a sequence @m " rn ~ n) o f  e-formulas (each with free 
variables x and y )  such that 
A'l-- fit' VyEVAxEV[O v~. : ]  . 
tn ~ ti 
Then there is an e-form,da gO (with free variables x and z) such that 
A*k  VzeVAxeV[O v ~)1  • 
Proof. Since 
A*P -VyEV W AxEV[O v ~ >%nl , 
m E n 
evidently 
A 'P -  Vy~VVuEVAxEV(O v ,  ; 
~-~ W [ u = a,,,  ^  ~. ,  (x, y)  ] ) ,  
m E n 
so if we take (9(x, z) to be 
Vu, y(Oc(u,Y ,Z)^ W [u =A m^%n(x ,y ) ] )  
m En 
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we easily obtain the conclusion of the lem ha.  
We now seek to satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 3.10. The idea is to 
find (for each ® ment ioned in Theorem 3.9) a formula qs which we may 
use in Lemma 3.6 to obtain an e-formula @e such that 
1) A*+DF ve DAx~-V[O v~-~®e]  . 
Thus there will be a finite number  n of instances cr m of DF*  from 
which the conch  f 1 ) fellows. Wc wil~ choose ,Is so that we also 
~ (with free variables x, y)  such have, for each m.  i ~ 2, formulas %,z 
that 
;1 .  2) A* + "" o n I-- W Vy E V Ax ~ V[O v s0 m 
i~2  
The hypotheses of Lemma 3.10 then follow (taking the n of 3.10 to be 
2n + 1, and setting ¢2n = ®Q), since 
A*I--( W ~Om)V /~ o m 
m ~ n m ~ ~t 
Thus to complete the proof  of Theorem 3.9, we need only find such a 
q,, and prove 2) for it. 
Choose ,P to be the conjunct ion of the formulas 
Ax ' ix '  ~ x/x ~ D(x', x) -+ V~0, a e Rx' V3,(x' ~ 3' A 
A E(x', 3') A [ 3, = x v U3,S(a, ~, y ,  x ) l  )1 , 
A x', 3, (x', 3, c x ^ E(x', 3,) -+ 
At E Rx'[ gRx' (t) ~+ ®RT(t)]). 
Here D(x', x) formalizes 'x' is definable in (Rx. e} using parameters 
from Rx" ,  E(x', x) formalizes RRx',  e~ is an e lementary substructure of 
(Rx, e)', and UyS(a, ~0, 3,, x) formalizes '3' is definable in (Rx, e) by the 
formula ~, using parameters ai'; 0 is the formula of  Theorem 3.9. 
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By Theorem 2.12 o f  Sectiun 2 it is clear that A* I- qt(a), so we may 
use q, in Lemma 3.6. 
To show that 2) holds, we may suppose that "-~ %: is (the existential 
closure of) 
l) y E V ^ ~I,(~) ^ Ord(/3) ^  U/30 m (B, y )  ^ /3 ¢ V,  
where the free variables of  O,n ([3, y)  are/3 and y. We will argue infor- 
mally within A*. Assuming 1 ), evidently Lemma 3.2 applies, se we have 
o~ ~ ~ A ~ D(e~,/3). We conclude using q~(~) that there are ¢, a, and "~ 
such that ~, a ,.=- V and either 
or else 
UTS(a,  ~p, 7, /3)  A AX E Rc~[® R°~ ~ O R~' ] 
) =/3A AX E Ro~[® Ra ~ O R~t ] , 
so that eithe~- 
t \x  e: Ra[O Ra ~ V/3 VT(0  m (/3, y )  A S(a, ~o, q¢, 13) ^  O R7 )] 2) 
or else 
2') Ax ~ Ra[O Ra , , V/3(0,n (t~,y) ^ oRa) ]  . 
Evidently a does not occur on the right hand side of either 2) or 2'). 
Now we can collapse the three parameters ~0, a, y into one parameter 3'
i (i = 0,1 ~ such ,tllat (for example using Val). Thus we obtain formulas ¢,,~ 
A* -t -~ o 
m 
i 1 t-- W Vy~VAxEV[O v , ,e ra  
i 
as desired. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.9. 
Corollary 3.11. Let F be a finite set o f  e-Jbrmulas with one free variable 
x, and q, one such formula. Then 
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A* l-- ,t,(V) ~ VV'(q,(V') ^ V ~ V' A 
^ ~ Ax~V[O v~ ,~0 v ' ] ) .  
® el: 
Proof. By Theorem 3.9. the existential closure of 
1) ( /}{k . I ' oeV)  A /}~ AxEVI®V(x)~"+~3(x ,y~) ]  
~@F OEF  
is provable in A* (where e is a certain e-formula with free variables 
%, o 1 ). Now using the upward reflection principle (1.7d), we see that 
2) VV'01,(V')AVEV'^ /~ Ax~V'tOV'(x)~-~O(x,'; )]) 
OEF 
follows in A* from 1 ) and the hypothesis q,(V). Thus the existential 
closure of the conjunction of 1 ) and 2) is provable in A*; from this the 
corollary follows at once. 
Examination cf our proof of Theorem 3.9 shows that it gives an 
effective way of proving in A the relativization to Ra of every axiom of 
ZF. Tlms combining our results with Levy's results, we have a finitary 
proof of 
Corollary 3.1 2. ZF is consistent if]" A is consistent. 
Remark. Consider tlae theory A' obtained from A by replacing Acker- 
mann's chema A J, by 
1) At Io(t ,  x, 3') ~-" o v (t, x,  y )  ^ t ~ V)I --, 
-~ Vz At ( t  e z ~ O(t, x, y ) ) ,  
(.O|!¢ easily sees that 1 ) is equivalent to the schema obtained by adding 
the ¢!ause 
2) At ~ V[®(t, x, y)~-+ O v (t, x, y)] 
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to the antecedent of A4). Theorem 3.1 holds with A* replaced by A'; 
the proof is essentially the same. The main difficulty is in proving the 
elementary results (e.g. those collected in Theorem 1.6, especially 
f.g.h.); one must be careful to check absoluteness in order to apply 1). 
Thereafter most of the results we prove for A* hold for A', with the 
reservation that in cerlain schemata involving ~ one must add 2) to the 
antecedent. 
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In 4.1 we give applications of  Levy's reflection principles to obtain 
information about the strength of  A*. In 4.2, we discuss natural models 
of A*. Some questions are posed in 4 .3 -4 .5 .  
4.1. The strength o f  A* 
Definit ion 4.1. Let T1, T 2 be arbitrary theories. 
a. T l is said to be finitely axiomatizable over T 2 iff there is a sen- 
tence o of the language of T l , such that "1" 2 + T 1 = T 2 + o. 
b. T I is said :0 be essentially not finit~iy axiomatizable over T 2 iff 
there is no consistent heory T' including ]'1 which is finitely axioma- 
tizable over T 2 . 
Theorem 4.2. A* is essentially not Jbliteiv axiomatizab]e over the class 
construction schema A2. 
Proof. Suppose that T = A2 + O(V) includes A* (where O is an e-for- 
mula with one free variable x). We will show that T is inconsistent. One 
easily shows that 
A* [-- O(V)  ~ VX(X E V ^ UX[Ord(X) ,,, 
^ OtRX) a AX' e X "-- O(RX')I ) 
hence as T t--- tg(V), 
(1) T I- VX(X e V^ UX[Ord0 , )^O(RX)^ AX '~ X ~ O(RX ' ) I ) .  
We may introduce an individual constant ~o for the X defined in 1): For 
each instance ~(V) of A2, we evidently have 
T t- AX ~ o~ ¢(RX) ; 
in particular, we have T 1-- ¢(R~o)  ^  O(RX0) , which we write symboli- 
cally as 
T(R~) ~ T(R~o) .  
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Now by i), 
T(V) I- V;~ ~ V[Ord(h) ^  O(RX)] 
so evidently (replacing V by R?~ 0) 
T(RX 0) I-- V~ ~ R;~0[Ord(~ ) ^ O(Rh)] . 
On the other hand, the definition of ;~0 assures 
T I-- A;~ ~ R;~ 0 [Ord(~) ~ ~ O(R;~)] . 
Thus T is inconsistent. Since any finite axiomatization over A2 has the 
form O(V), this shows that A* is essentially not finitely axiomatizable 
over A2. 
In Ackermann's original paper introducing the theory A, he also dis- 
cussed an extension Aoo of A. Aoo is based on the idea that there can be 
sets of different "orders", so that something which appears as a class 
from the poi:at of view of "order o:ae" may be a set of "order two". 
Thus A~ has individual constants V0, V l , .,,, ; the old sets (members of 
V) become the sets of order zero (members of V0), and V l , V 2, ... cor- 
respond to the sets of higher orders. Also a final class Voo is introduced 
which includes all the lower orders. We give here Levy's form ot Ao,, 
(see Levy [8i ), which is slightly stronger than Ackermann's originat 
version. 
Definition 4.3. a. A,,~ is the theory (formulated in a language with 
binary predicate , and individual constants V, (n ~ ~)  and V~)  whose 
axioms are the universal closures of A1 (er.tensionality), 
A2' (class construction schema) 
Vz At(t ~t z ~ , t~  V=,^ O) 
(where z does~iaot ccur in O) 
4t 
A31~ (n _< ~, - strong completeness for V n) Sc(V,), 
A4'n (n _< ~ - modified Ackermann schema), 
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x, y ~ V,, ^  At (~(t .  x. y)  ~ t ~ V,,) 
Vz e V At ( t  e z ~ ¢( t ,x .  v'D 
where ¢ is a formula involving only V 
111 
occur  in ~, 
C V,~ c Voo ( fo rnEco) .  A6' Vn - +I - 
for  m <~ n, and z does  not  
b. A*  is obtained from A~ by adding the regularity axioms 
A5' AxcV [Vt t (u~x) - -  Vu(u6x^At( t~x~tq~u) ) ]  
for each n < ~. 
A simpler characterization f A~ is the follow ing. 
Theorem 4.4. Aoo may be ax iomat ized by 
A(V,)  all sentences ~(V,,) such that ¢(V) is an axiom o f  A (where 
A6 V n ~V +1 EVoo (wherenEco) .  
Proof. Evidently A,,o yields AI(V,,)= AI, A3(V,:), A4(V,z), and (using 
A6') A2(V,)  for each n < o~. To see that A6 holds, in A4' take t ~ V m 
for ~ and m + 1 for n. and conclude (using V ~ ~ V m + 1 ) that 
V m E V m+j.  By A3'. V m+l E V~ also, so A-3 holds. 
In the other direction, AI ,  A2', ~3' are assumed, and A6' follows 
t , from A6 using A3'. Now it is easy to see that A4 (V,)  yields A4 n , 
t A6 assures that the parameters Vi, i E n may occur in the ¢ of A4 n . 
Theorem 4.5. ldent i fv  V 0 with V. Then .for each e, V-sentence o, 
A*  1- o i f f  A*  I--- o. 
Proof.  Evident ly A* b o impl ies A*  I- o. Let ¢ be a formula  wi th  one 
free variable x, and suppose that ~(V) is provable in A* .  Then by the 
preceding theorem, there is a formula O with one free variable x such 
that A* b O(V)  and 
I-- O(V o) ^...^ O(V)  ^ O(V~)  ^  V o ~ ... E V n e Voo -~ ~0(Vo). 
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Thus ~t will suffice to prove in ~ * the existential closures of  the for- 
mulas 
1) I~(V)  A{~(Vn) A...A O(V0)AVe O,1 E ... E O 0 
(where A* I-- O(V), and n ~ co). (Now o 0 plays the role of  V~o, % that 
of  V 1.) The proof is by induction on n. Assume the result for m. and 
let "4, be the existential closure of  1 ) (taking n = m). Then the induction 
hypothesis yields 
A* I-- q,(V) 
and by til~ upward reflection principle ( 1.7d) we get 
2) A* I- VV,n+l [V C ore+ , A q,(v,n ÷l )1 " 
Evidently 2) implies tile existential closure of 1 ) for tl = m + 1. This 
completes the proof. 
4.2. Natural  models  o f  A. 
We now proceed to some rer.aarks on natural models of  A. 
Definition 4.6. Let o~,/3 be ordinals, n ~ a ~/3. We write Ra -< R¢3 iff for 
It 
every 3' ~ Ro~, 
(Ro~ + n, e,  x> --- (R/3 + n,  e, x , ' .  
Remark. Ra -< R/3 iff Ra <: R/3, and Ra -< R/3 means that R/3 is a 2nd 
0 1 
order extension of Ro~. We could as well write 
(Ra + n, e, x)  x E Ro~ =- (14,[3 + tl ,  e ,  X )  x ERa  ' 
(using a common notation) because finite sequences are representable 
in these structures. 
The condition R, < R@ and.0 E 0 is fairly strong, as will be shown in 
1 
Theorem 4.12, The next theorem shows that the condition is weaker 
than certain conditions which have been discussed in the literature. 
Definition 4.7. Let /3 be an ordinal, and n E p. We say p is n-indescribable 
iff for every first order sentence u involving e and one additional unary 
predicate symbol X, and every X C_ Rp, if (Rp + n, E, X> l= 0 then there 
isanordinalcxE@suchthat(Ror+n,e,Xn Ra>l=u. 
For rt E Y, we say that ,8 is izth order indescribable iff for every 
t)t E II, 0 &s m-indescribable. 
Remark. It is known for example that if K is a measurable cardinal then 
there is 0 E K such that for every n E p, 0 is n-indescribable (Vaught 
[ 20 I; also see Reinhardt-Silver [ 141 and Silver [ 161, ch. 4). The notion 
of indescribability was introduced by Hanf and Scott in 171. It should 
be remarked that p is 2nd order indescribable iff (R,IJ + 1, E) is a model 
of Fernays strong set theory (see Bernays I2 I ). 0 is strongly inaccessible 
iff 0 is O-indescribable. 
Theorem 4.8. If‘p is (n + i )-ittdescribable, then thew ;- 
such slut t 
Sketch of proof. In the definition of (n + 1 )-indescriballlrity take 
X = (<y, 6) : (RP + n, E) t= O[y] and y E Rp) . 
(Evidently 0 = k I(3 so X C_ RB). There is an e-formula 8 with one free 
variable such that for every ordinal /3, every e-formula 8, and any 
YE R, 
,6 Ackermann's set theory equals ZF 
Now apply indescribability: since we have 
(R/t + n + 1, e, X)  l= At  ~ R/~(t ~ X-  ~ ; xI,(t)) 
(of course R# is expressible in terms of X and e), we may choose c~. c 
such that 
(Ra+n+l ,e ,  XnRc : )b  AtER~(tEX< , , I , ( t ) ) .  
Consequently, for all y ERa ,  and all e-tbrmulas 0, 
(y ,O)  E Xn  Ra 
and thus Rt~ < R#. 
n 
iff (Ra+n,e)  p0[y ]  
i f f  (R~+n,e)~0[y l  , 
Theorem 4.9. f f  Rt~ < R/~ and n E ~ E ~, then 
n 
(R/~ + n,  e, Ra)  ~ A .  
Proof. It is enough to show that (treating t~ as a constant) the schema 
1) xE  Ra^O(x ,a ) - *  Vy~aO(x ,y )  
holds in (R~ +n, e,a), i.e. in (P, fl +n, e) when~ denotes a. 
First observe that since (Ra, e) -< (RtLe), we certainly have 
x,  y E a implies x + y E ot 
(where + is ordinal addition). 
Let A(o o, v l) be a formula expressing 
'Oo,O 1 are ordinals, and there is an ordinal whose order 
type is the ordinal sum v o + 01'. 
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Evidently for all ordinals ~, n, if n ~ ~ and x ~ R~ + ~, we have 
2) (R~+n,e)  l= A[x ,n]  iff xe~.  
Now the hypothesis of the theorem is that for x E R~, 
<R~ + n, e,x> = (Ra + n, e,x>, 
which is to say that (treating a, n as self-denoting constants) the schema 
3) x o ..... Xm_ 1 e R~ -~ [~< > CR~+"I 
holds in <Rt3 + n, e> (here Xo, ..., x m_) exhaust he free variables of ~o). 
Evidently (by 2)) 
4) x ~ Ra^ O(x, a ) - ,  Vy[A(y, n)A O(x,y)I  
holds in <R~ + n, e>, so app;ying 3) (witb parameters x, n ~ Ra) to 4) 
we get 
-+ V.): E Rot+nlA  Rot+n (y, n) ^  O Ra+n (x, y)] 
so 2) yields 
Vy e Rt~[® Ra÷n (x, Y)] 
and thus 3) yields the schema 1 ) as desired. 
Remark. This shows (assuming the appropAate indescribable cardinals 
exist) that <R~, e, Rat I = A does not imply <Ra, e> -< <Rt3, e), and even 
that < R~, e, Re> ~ A and < R#, e) ~ Z does not imply (R~, e> ~- ZF. For 
suppose that Ra < R/~; then <Rt~ + 1, e, RcC ~ A, but evidently not 
1 
(Ra, e> -< (R/3 + 1, e>. Or suppose that Ra -< R/3; then <RE + ~,  e, Ra> 
tO  
A and < R# + co, e) ~ Z, but evidently not (P/3 + ~,  e) ~: ZF. 
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We will now show (T~eorem 4.12) a weakened converse of Theorem 
4.8. Theorem 4.12 is known (the proof for the c~se n = ! is carried out 
in Tharp [24] ; the general statement isgiven in Reinhardt [ 15a] ); for 
completeness we include the proof here. First a definition. 
Definition 4.10. Let O be an e-formula with free variables x, y. Let # be 
an ordinal, and A c_ R/3. We say that O well orders A in R/3 iff 
{(u, o> : (Rg, e) P O[u, o] and u, o ~ A} 
is a well ordering of A. 
It is well known that the axiom of constructibility provides nice well 
orderings. In particular we will need 
Theorem 4.11. (G6del). Suppose that V = L. Then for  every limit 
ordinal ~ >_ o~, there is an e-formula 0 such that 0 wel! orders R~ + 1 in 
R~+l. 
For proof see G6del [ 5 ]. 
Theorem 4.12. Suppose that 04= n ~ ~, Ra -< RO, and that ¢ isafor -  
mula which well orders R# + 1 in Rf3 + n. Tlten ~ and ~ are n-indescrib- 
able. 
Proof. To simplify the discussion we assume n = 1 ; all the ideas are con- 
tained in this case. 
It is enough to see that for every e-formula O (with one free variable) 
and every X c R~, we have 
1) i f (R# + 1, e) ~ ®[X] then there exists a ~ # such that 
(R~ + 1, e) ~ O[X n Rc~]. 
Suppose that 1 ) fails. Then there is an e-formula ® (with free variable x) 
and an X c_ R# such that 
2) O(x )^~ Vo~ 5[0R°~+l(x n Ro~)] 
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holds in (Re + 1, e> when x takes the value X. (Here we use the defina- 
bility oft3 in (P,43 + 1, e); in the general case ene can use the definabil ity 
o f# in (Rt3 + n, e, n>.) Let ",I, (x )be  the formula displayed in 2). Then 
since ~, well orders Re + 1 in R/3 + 1, 
3) V!  x('4, (x)^ Ay[~0(y, x) ^ q' O,') --~ x : y] ) 
holds in ( R/3 + 1, e), and hence (since Re -< R/3) in < Ra + 1, e> ,also. Let 
1 
X' be the subset of Re defined by 3) in (Re + 1, e), and X be the subset 
of R/3 defined by 3) in ( R~ + 1, e). Since Re -< R/3, for each x ~ Ra we 
1 
have 
x~ X' iff x~X.  
Thus X' = X c, Re. By the definit ion of  X', it must satisfy xo (and 
hence 0) in (R,~ + 1, e), so we have 
4 ¸  ) (R/3 + 1, t) ~ Ve ~/3 ®Re+l [X' I  . 
Thus since X' = X n Re, X must satisfy 
Ve ~/3 0 Re+l(x C~ Re) 
in (R~ + 1, e). which contradicts (R/3 + 1, e) N q, [X].  Thus/3 must be 
1-indescribable. Since for each formula O, and every ordinal/3, the con- 
dition 
'for every X c_ R/3, 1) holds' 
is expressible in < R/3 + 1, e>, we see that a is also 1-indescribable. This 
completes the proof. 
Remark. Theorem 4.12 shows that if V = L, and Re -< R/3, e ~/3, then 
t 
e is greater than the first inaccessible cardinal, thus settling a question 
of Levy and Vaught in case V = L (the general question remains open). 
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4.3. Questions related to A about definability in natural models. 
We now raise some questions about definability in natural model~ 
which are related to Ackermann's set theory. 
Theorem 4.9 generalizes a result of L~vy's (he obtained the case 
n = I ). Is there a second order version of Grewe's theorem 2.8? 
Question 4.13. Let o~, fl be ordinals. Suppose that for every x ~ Ra, a is 
not definable in (R~3 + 1, e, x). Is there a 7 <- # such that a ~ ~, and 
Ro~ -< R3,? 
l 
Theorem 4.9 shows (assuming there are various indescribable cardi- 
nals) that we can have a wide variety of ordinals a, # such that 
(R#, e, R~) ~ A but not Ra --- R~. The methods of proof do not seem 
to answer the following question, however. 
Question 4.14. Suppose that a,/3, ~, are ordinals,/3 ~ 7 and R/3 -< RT, 
and for every x ~ Ra, o~ is not definable in ( R/3, e, x). Does it follow 
that Ra -< R/3? 
Remark. This is equivalent to the question whether we must have 
Ra -< R/3 if (RT, e, Ra), (RT, e, R G) are models of A with ~ <_/3. The 
syntactic question corresponding to this is whether the schema 
1) x~V 0- ,  [O vo~e v~] 
(where x is the only free variable of the e-formula 0) is probable in A*.  
This question is related to Theorem 3.c~ , which says that (in A*) the 
quantifier 'Vx ~ V' can be eliminated in favor of an expression (which 
has a parameter y ~ V) involv!ng only e. Improving Theorem 3.9 to 
read: 
2) For every e-formula O with one free variable x there is an e-formula 
e) with one free variable x such that 
A I -x  ~_v-* [O v ~ ~0]  
would immediately yield 1 ) and thus a positive answer to Question 4.14. 
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The following question is more closely related to type theory with 
typical ambiguity (see Specker [ 18] ) than to A, but seems to have the 
flavor of the preceding questions. 
Question 4.15. How large is the first ordir.al 3' such that there are 
ordinals ai, i ~ ~ for which i </ -+ ai < e /and 
3) (R3', e, Oti) i -to =- (R')', e, 0ti+l)iEto 9 
Remark. If 3' satisfies the condition ~, -+ (~)< ~ (introduced by Silver 
$V 
[ 161, p. 78), then it is easy to see that 7 satisfies 3). (Silver's condition 
is satisfied if 3' is a measvrable cardinal.) But the condition 3) is prob- 
ably quite weak. 
4.4. Quest ions about  f in i te  axio.matizabi l i ty.  
Next we consider some questions about ffinite axiomatizability. 
In most cases where we have a proof that a theory T is not finitely 
axiomatizable over a theory S, the methods of proof yield a stronger 
result, namely that if S c_ T' c_ T and T' is finitely axiomatizable over S, 
then the consistency of T' is provable in T. (Of course a precise formu- 
lation of the stronger result is sensitive to the way ' I "  is consistent' is
expressed.) I would like to mention some examples of theories T, S 
such that the consistency of S is not provable in I-, but it appears likely 
that T is not finitely axiomatizable over S. 
Conjecture 4.16. 
a. A + Z is not finitely axiomatizable over A. 
b. A + ZF is not finitely axi~matizable over A. 
The weak comprehension schema of' Z- was introduced and studied 
by Tarski. He showed that Z is essentially not finitely axiomatizable 
over Z - ,  and that Z- is finitely axiomatizable (unpublished). I do not 
even know whether A + Z- I-- Z. Of course b implies a. We can make 
some conjectures even stronger than b. For this we need some defini- 
tions. 
Definition 4.17. The theory ZA is formulated in the language of A, 
with axioms A1, A2, A3, A5 and the following schema of complete 
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reflection: 
x ,y~V~[ov  ,--~O] 
(where ® is an e-formula whose only free variables are x, y). 
The theory ZA was introduced by Vaught (as a technical device) in 
connection with Ldvy's proof of the consistency of A (see [ 8 ] ). For 
completeness we mention the main result relating ZA and ZF. 
Theorem 4 .18 .  
a. For  e-selztences o, ZA I-- o i l l  ZF  t- o. 
b. Ac_ZA. 
Sketch of proof. See Levy [8]. a. ZF ~ ZA is essentially Theorem 2.7 
of Levy, Montague, Vaught. The proof that for e-sentences ZA I-- o im- 
plies ZF I--- o uses the reflection principle for ZF (Montague [ 12] ). 
b. It is enough to check DF c_ ZA, as the reflection principle for V 
(Theorem 1.7c) is contained in DF + ZF and implies Ackermann's 
schema A4. (DF is defined by Definition 3.3.) Notice that a and b to- 
gether show Levy's half of theorem 3.1. 
Definition 4.19. Let T, S be theories in a language with e, V-formuias. 
We say T is neatly interpretable in S iff there is an e-formula ,p with one 
free variable x such that 
a. T I--- o impl ies  S I-- o ~' , 
b. S ~- (x E y v x -C- y ) A ¢(y)  -~ ~p(>.), 
c. S I -yC  V--, ~0(y). 
Remark. Grewe showed in [61 that A + Z- is neatly interpretable in A* 
Con jecture  4 .20 .  
ZA is not finitely axiomatizable over A + DF. 
Question 4.21. Let T be neatly interpretable in A + DF. Does it follow 
that Z is essentially not finitely axiomatizable over T? 
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A positive answer to 4.21 implies 4.20 which in turn implies 4.16b. 
The last example seems in some sense more elementary. The theories 
have infinite similarity type, but this defect may be removed by simply 
considering the e-part of the theories. 
Question 4.22. T will be a theory formulated in a language with e and 
individual constants Vn (for each n ~ ~).  The axioms of T include (for 
each n) the pairing, union, and power set axioms relativized to V n , the 
schema A2 with V replaced by V n , and an axiom V n ~_ V n t 1. Is T + Z 
finitely axiomatizable over T? 
4.5. Comparing A and A*. Since A* is interpretable in A (by taking Ro, 
for V), and A* is firAtely axiomatizable over A by definition, the theo- 
ries are of essentially the same strength (although it is easy to prove 
that A* 4: A). Moreover the two theories have the same natural models. 
Thus, both from the point ofvizw of relative consistency, and from the 
point of view of natural models, questions about what is provable in A 
without use of A5 are curiosities. For completeness, however, I mention 
the following questions which 1 have not answered. 
Question 4.24. a. Is the replacement schema relativized to V provable 
in A? 
b. 
C. 
A* ? 
A ~ Vz At ( t  ~ z ~ t =V)? 
If we add the reflection principle for V (1.7c) to A do we obtain 
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Section 5 
This section has two parts. The first part extends the main result of 
Section 3 to certain extensions of ZF and A. The second contains an 
analysis of the intuitive ideas behind Ackermann's theory. This ana2ysis 
suggests the introduction of an extension A+ of A. 
5. I. Extension of 3.1. To illustrate the method we extend Theorem 3.1 
to ZM and A~. 
Definition 5.1. a. ZM is the set of e-sentences provable in tile theory 
obtained from ZA (see Definition 4.17) by adding rhe axiom 
e 0 x~VAAu~x Vo~VRl (u ,o , r ) -+ 
VyEVAu~x Vo~y Rl(u,v,r)  
b. A~ is obtained from A* by adding %. 
Remark. Notice that e 0 is a replacement axiom; it assures that a is in- 
accessible. ZM and stronger theories ZM A have been studied in the 
literature. (See especially Levy [8, 9]. ZA is the theory Sb of [81 .) 
Other characterizations of ZM are known; the one we have chosen for 
5. la is due to Levy and will be convenient in the proof of 5.2. Results 
analogous to 5.2 hold for ZM A , and indeed can be proved in the same 
way. 
Theorem 5.2. 
A~l--o v iff ZM| -o .  
Proof. First we show that if ¢ is an e-formula with free variable x, and 
~(V) is any theorem of ZA, then 
1) A* ~ VV'(~0V'(v) A V ~ V' A Sc(V')). 
It is enough to show that for any finite set F of axioms of ZA, we can 
show 
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2) A* t-- VV'(V ~ V'^ Sc(V') a /~ oV'). 
o~F 
Now the axioms of ZA are A1, instances of the schema A2, A3, and in- 
stances of the complete reflection schema 
3) Ax E V(O v , . ,  O) 
(where O is an e-formula with one free variable x). (Arguil g informally 
in A* now) for an7 V' such that V c- V' and Sc(V'), it is evident hat all 
instances of A2 hold relativized to v' ,  and the relativizatiens to V' of 
3) become 
4) A x E V(® v' ,--~ ®v'). 
But now Corollary 3.11 allows us tc :hoose V' so that V E V' and 
Sc(V') and any finite number of instances of 4) hold. This establishes 
2) and hence 1 ). 
Now evidently A~ c ZA + e 0, so if A~ l- o v then ZM I-- o. If 
ZM I- o, then ZA I- e 0 -~ o v . By 1), we then have 
A* t- VV'(V ~ V'^ Sc(V')n(e 0 ~ ov)v ' ) ,  
and since 
A*t -V~V'ASc(V ' ) -~[%-~e ]^[ (ov)  v ~o  v l  , 
it follow, that A* ~- e o ~, o v , i.e. A~ ~- o v as desired. 
5.2. On "'sharply delimited collections". The next paragraph is devoted 
to an analysis of the intuitive ideas behind Ackermann's theory. 
It was mentioned in the introduction that the basis for Ackermann's 
axioma schema A4 appears to be the idea that sufficiently sharply de- 
limited collections of sets are sets. In this connection I would like to 
suggest that it is helpful to think of "the collection of all sets (V) is not 
sharply delimited" as meaning that there are various classes which are 
possible interpretations of the collection of all sets, among which there 
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is no clear choice. Thus the individual constant V is to be thought of  as 
a variable which could denote any of  (say) V 0' V l , V 2 , .... (This sug- 
gestion seems to be consonant with the theory Aoo considered by 
Ackermann.) In order to formulate the principle 'sharply del imited 
collection of sets are sets' we must explain 'sharply delhnited'  also for 
(at least some) collections other than the collection of  all sets. If ~(t) is 
any formula (with one free variable t) we explain the not ion for the col- 
lection of  sets satisfying ~0(t). This collection corresponds to the formula 
,I,(V, t) = ~0(t) ^  t ~ V; thus it is natural to say that the collection is 
sharply delimited if what satisfies ,!, (V, t) is independent of the inter- 
pretation of V. In order to simplify the discussion let us assume there 
are exactly two interpretations of the collection of  all sets, V 0 and V l , 
and that V 0 c_ V 1" Now the formula 
1) A (q,(V 0 , t ) ,  , ,J,, (V 1 , t)) 
t 
expresses that the question whether t satisfies q, (V, t) is independent of
the interpretation of  V, i.e. { t : ,J., (V, t) } is sharply delimited. Then the 
principle'that sharply delimited collections of  sets are sets is expressed 
by 
2) A (q,(V 0, t ) ,  , q,(V 1 , t)) ~ Vz ~ V 0 At ( t  ~ z ~ q,(V 0, t ) ) .  
t 
Evidently if ~(t) does not involve V, and we have 
3) 
then 
4) 
At(~o(t) ~ t ~ V 0) 
At ( : ( t )^  t~ Vo,  ,~, ~( t )^ t~ Vl) 
so that we have by 2) 
K t (¢ ( t )~ t ~ V o) ~ Vz ~ V o At ( t~ z ~ ~ ~o(t)), 
which, if we identify V 0 and V l , is a special case of A4. We get A4 itself 
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simply by allowing x, y as free variables in ®, adding 'x, y ~ V 0' to the 
hypotheses of  2). 
These considerations suggest he following definition. 
Definition 5.3. A + is a theory (in a language with binary predicate and 
two individual constants V, V') whose axioms are 
1. The axioms of A* except for Ackermann's schema A4. 
2. VC_ V'. 
3. The universal closures of the following schema (in place of  A4) 
A4 ÷ x ,y~ V^ A (~(V, x ,y ,  t) A t~ V ~:-" ~(V', x ,y ,  t) A t~ "V') 
t 
Vz ~ V At(t ~ z *--~ t ~ V/x ¢(V, x,  Y, t)) 
(where ~ is an e-formula whose free variables are among v 0, v 1 , 02,  1) 3 
and z does not occur in ~). 
Remark. It is not hard to show that A + is consistent if A* plus the fol- 
lowing schema of indescribability is consistent: 
i) x, yC_ V^ @(V,x,y)--~ Vv~_VO(v ,  xNv ,  yNo) ,  
where 63 is any e-formula with free variables v0, v l, v2 ; of  course n is to 
be an appropriate representation f  intersection. For an indication of a 
proof see [15a; Chapter 5, p. 78].  The schema 1) was considered by 
Vaught [20] and shown to be consistent with A* if ZF + 'there is a 
measurable cardinal' is consistent. For a stronger esult, see Reinhardt- 
Silver [ 14] ; prools can be found in Silver [ 16]. It seems likely that A* 
plus l ) is much stronger than A + , but l know no resultz, in this direc- 
tion. 
Theorem 5.4. 
a. A*~A + , 
b. A + t- V~V' .  
Proof. Evidently we have already proved a. To prove b, we argue infor- 
mally in A + . Let ~ range over ordinals, and V = Ra. If 
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Ro~={x" V#~V(x~R~C- V)}= 
={x" Vfl~V'(xER/3CV')}, 
thc~n by A4 + , Ra ~ Ra, which is impossible. Thus we may choose 13 ~ V' 
so that  RO ~ V' and R/3 _~" Re.  Now a =/~ v ~ ~ a -~ R/~ C Ra, so for  this 
/~, a ~ ~ and we have V = Ra ~ R/3 c_ V' as desired. 
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